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Interviews

A Conversation with Rafik Schami

By Nadia Midani
Translated from German by Anthea Bell

Rafik Schami was born in Damascus in 1946, came to Germany in 1971, and studied chemistry in Heidelberg. Today he is the most successful German-speaking Arabic writer. His novels have been translated into twenty-three languages and received numerous international awards. His bestselling books include The Dark Side of Love, The Calligrapher’s Secret, and Damascus Nights.

Syrian journalist Nadia Midani spoke with Rafik Schami earlier this year. The following is an edited transcript of that conversation.

Nadia Midani: I’ll begin by asking what will be left in the end.  I know it’s a trap, and no one can give a real answer to that question, but I will ask it all the same: what alternatives face the Syrians now?

Rafik Schami: Only God can tell, along with a few of those who always think they know everything. But first, whoever wins, Syria will never return to conditions as they were before March 2011. Second, the present dramatic developments will leave many wounds behind, and they will take a long time to heal. Here lies the embryonic danger of civil war, which is cultivated by the regime so that it can claim to be fighting Sunni extremists. That virulent embryo will still be a danger even if the insurgency overthrows the president. Third, the regime has stripped off, forever,  Bashar al Assad’s mask as “the ophthalmologist who studied in London and is married to a charming, fashion-conscious woman.” Bashar al Assad is increasingly assuming the appearance of a dictator who— like his father in 1982—will bomb his country’s own cities, send marksmen to shoot down demonstrators, arrest and torture tens of thousands. Fourth …

N.M.: Could it be that he has lost control, and his brother Maher is now in charge of everything?

R.S.: The army and all fifteen secret services answer directly to the president. We can come back to that later, but for now a brief  response to the original question: fourth, the Syrians have paid a high price for casting off their fears. So far they have over  two thousand dead to mourn, and their insurgency may cost them yet more, but as they have done it all independently, indeed in isolation, and without any outside help, no dictatorship can terrify them now. The streets are becoming politicized as never before in the last hundred years. Every government will feel the force of that.

N.M.:  When and where exactly did the Syrian uprising begin?

R.S.: On March 15, 2011. It was children in the previously sleepy, dusty town of Daraa who unintentionally instigated revolt. Innocently and guilelessly, they wrote on the walls, in chalk and spray paint, things that adults were discussing only under their breath. Thereupon the head of the secret service in Daraa, a cousin of the president, had the children captured and tortured. That was more than the parents could tolerate.

N.M.: Unlike you, I still hoped that Assad junior would gradually implement reforms, and lead Syria into a democracy where many voices could be heard … I’ll admit now, in sackcloth and ashes, that at the time I publicly criticized your firm rejection of that idea when you wrote, “What Syria needs is democracy, not heirs to Assad.” All the same, I’ll ask you now, could there have been options other than rebellion?

R.S.: My obdurate attitude to that idea was, and still is, bound up with my exile. Exile has some advantages, as well as its obvious drawbacks. In exile, you can inform yourself better, and develop and express your thoughts freely. Syria was the first Arab republic to pass on power by inheritance. As if there were no other capable women or men in all Syria who could have governed the country—and done it in accord with the will of the people.  Appointing the colorless Bashar al-Assad, who took no interest in politics, as his father’s successor was alien to any concept of democracy. The secret services had grave doubts. The man was given a crash course in suitable behavior, and promoted to military ranks that would normally require  twenty years of army experience. He was then presented to the people as a reformer, and he did in fact set up two study groups, which met, of course, under the close supervision of the secret service. He allowed the publication of a satirical magazine, and had a few corrupt ministers arrested. From the first, it was nothing but a theatrical show of which he was director, until all the army generals and all of the leadership cadre either proclaimed their loyalty or were dismissed. After that he governed for eleven years without a single reform. It was easier to get a clear idea of all that from abroad than from within the country. Here in exile, we turned a skeptical eye to the euphoria. We saw the old Mafia replaced, but by their sons; that was the sole change. And the regime of those sons grew even bolder. Who gave away all telecommunications rights to his cousin? How can a penniless cousin of the president get to be a billionaire in ten years? Where do the billions of the Assad family in European and American banks come from? And then that same Assad presents himself to his people as anti-American.

N.M.: All the same, why can’t such a regime be reformed?

N.S.: Because at the very first step toward serious reform it would implode, collapsing from the center outward. That first step would have to be the dissolution of all  fifteen secret services. The second would be to give the Syrian people back the billions of which they have been robbed. We don’t need developmental aid. Anything else is only a superficial spectacle staged for the benefit of an equally superficial press. An opportunity for reform did in fact exist for a few days. As soon as the uprising began,  the president, with the support of the majority of the population, which never demanded his removal but was demonstrating for freedom and democracy and against corruption, could have gathered some of his best advisers around him and dissolved the secret services. He would have had to introduce radical reforms in comprehensible steps that were open to daily scrutiny. He would have been the hero of the people, and the people would have protected him and his life. Alternatively, he might have been dead even before he had announced the last clause of his proposed reforms, murdered by his own henchmen. But as they would not have had time to build anyone up as his successor, the change to democracy would have come more quickly.

N.M.: Is Bashar al-Assad really leader of the regime, or just a puppet of the secret services?

R.S.: He’s its leader. He shares power with his family, but he bears full responsibility, because the army and the secret service answer directly to him. On the other hand he himself, like his leadership, is caught in a system that oppresses and dictates to  twenty million people. 

N.M.: Does the fact that children began the revolution explain the hatred of the secret services for them? The murder of Hamza al Khatib, for instance?

R.S.: Not entirely, because they could have killed him and made sure that he was never seen again, like thousands of others who have disappeared without trace. But they brought the boy’s mutilated body back to his parents. He must have suffered hell on earth in the last hour of his life. It was a message, a warning: we will spare no one, and we will hit you where it hurts most.

N.M.: But it had the opposite effect.

R.S.: Because the secret service didn’t stop to think that even the most peace-loving of Syrians are implacable if you touch their children. Hamza al Khatib became the icon of the Syrian revolution, and since his death the insurgents have been demonstrating not just on Fridays, as they did before, but every day.

N.M.: But not in Aleppo and Damascus, except on the outskirts of those large cities. A friend of mine phones me regularly from a bar in the center of Damascus, laughing and chatting as if he were in Paris.

R.S.: The tradition of cities in Asian countries, including Syria, is not the same as in Europe. In an Arab city, for instance, the ruler was ever-present with his adherents, military leaders, and the organizations of the secret service, the army, and the police. Feudal lords lived in cities, not on their landed estates as they did in Europe, where the city was able to develop as a civil power, a counterweight to theirs, and a center of resistance. In Damascus and Aleppo traders and industrialists, importers, and other beneficiaries of the system have made more profit than ever before in history. The people of those cities therefore have something to lose. Insurgency in Damascus and Aleppo would mean the end of the regime.

N.M.: And why didn’t the provinces rebel against the father, only now against the son?

R.S.: Because the time wasn’t ripe for it then, because insurgency had to be triggered by events in the neighboring Arab countries, and because Assad senior and his aides came from the provinces themselves, and cultivated their relationship with their origins. Many thousands from the tribes of the men in power were appointed to posts in the army, the secret service, and the police. The second generation, that’s to say the sons of those men, became townsfolk and were happy to forget their peasant origin. The people of the provinces were plunged into misery and want, and now they are answering back.

N.M.: The regime says it is fighting armed terrorists. By now that claim looks more than ridiculous, since over fifteen thousand Syrians have fled from the army allegedly protecting them and taken refuge in Turkey. I admire the courage of the civilians who hope for peaceful regime change, but in view of the brutality of the troops of the president’s brother Maher al Assad, their attitude looks to me suicidal.

R.S.: The Syrian nation is showing what a civilization ten thousand years old means. I bow to that civilized stance. But about your fears. This  nonviolent insurgency in Syria is the longest in its history. No ruler in the world has an answer to that kind of thing. The regime is merely reacting, the initiative passed into the hands of the insurgents long ago, and they have already done a  great deal. The length of their nonviolent  resistance will overthrow the regime, whose movements are being paralyzed. The businessmen who still stand by the government will withdraw their support when their businesses fail. That’s the open secret of this revolution. Anyone calling on the Syrian people to take up arms is either an idiot or an agent of the regime, because if they did that, then the slavishly obedient, well-armed and well-drilled troops of the president’s brother, brother-in-law, and cousin would prevail.

N.M.: How great is the influence of writers and creative cultural figures in bringing democracy to Syria? Must intellectuals state the line they take on politics and insurgency?

R.S.: Literature and art can exert only indirect political influence. Whenever prominent figures in those fields have tried the direct way, the consequences have been catastrophic. The role of artists, writers, and intellectuals, in my opinion, is to intensify discussion during the period of insurgency, to encourage people to choose the humane path, and to offer the hand of friendship to their former enemies. Of course, independent courts will have to see that all crimes committed by the overthrown rulers get their just punishment. But not as an act of revenge—in the spirit of a democratic process aiming for maturity. Flight from responsibility with the aid of hypocritical arguments would be a mistake.

N.M.: Are any Syrian artists politically active in the country itself? What about those who work with the government?

R.S.: Of course some are politically active at home. In Syria, as well as in exile, there are courageous artists, writers, and intellectuals who oppose the dictatorship. There are also others who are hand in glove with the government and are happy to receive its patronage and prizes. The joke is that you can also find their names on the lists of signatures of those who want to see the regime overthrown. Now, however, the insurgents are publishing the names of these corrupt artists who will grovel to power. Dictators are like nuclear power stations: they promise much, and contaminate those who come into contact with them. Arabs are not alone in paying homage to the dictators. The prospect of gain has also seduced Germans and other Europeans into working for Saud, Assad, Gadhafi, and Saddam Hussein.

N.M.: What exactly is so seductive about power that it can attract intellectuals?

R.S.: It’s not so much the direct advantages—money, a car, a house—as the vanity that is gratified by proximity to power. Writers, artists, and intellectuals are far from immune to it. You accompany a president on a state visit, you’re received by the ministers—foreign affairs, home affairs, culture—of another country, you dine with prominent men who mention in passing that they were on the phone only yesterday to Obama, Sarkozy, the Devil in person for all I know. All that is tempting. Many such artists, particularly the older ones who feel that they are languishing in the shadows, will try to get a share of the limelight again—and make themselves look ridiculous.

N.M.: As far as I can tell, the Syrian uprising has no head, which gives me cause for concern. It is not led by any political party or cadre.  Isn’t that dangerous?

R.S.: What has happened in the Arab countries is unprecedented, and it is still going on. There has never been anything comparable in history before: a revolution without a charismatic leadership, without weapons, or a political party, victoriously bringing down dictators. It succeeded extremely well in Tunisia and Egypt. Syria is a more complicated proposition, because it is a very important piece in the whole Arab game of dominoes, and because its present regime has more experience than any other of civil war (in Lebanon) and of the uninterrupted rule of one family over a period of forty years. But it’s just because the uprising here is not led by any distinct group that the dictatorship is finding it so hard to suppress. Earlier, the regime could paralyze any opposition within a week by arresting its leadership. Today it arrests  ten thousand Syrian citizens, kills two thousand, destroys towns and cities—and the insurgency just gets stronger. That strength is also the weakness of the revolution, because unlike a centrally led movement, it has no distinct aim. Modern means of communication—Facebook, Twitter, the Internet, cameras, cellphones—provide it with something like a nervous system to protect it from deadly attack. But eventually there must be local coordinating committees, agreeing on strategy and tactics with other committees, or the insurgents will be going around in circles.

N.M.: Let’s assume that Assad falls. What comes next? What dangers lie in wait? Suppose fundamentalists try turning Syria into a theocratic state?

R.S.: Slowly, take it slowly! Assad hasn’t fallen yet, and I am afraid he’s not about to stand down without starting a civil war. Here he could model himself on Gadhafi. That would be a catastrophe, and all my articles in opposition newspapers warn Syrians against that danger. It exists because so much blood has been shed, and because fundamentalists agitate against the Alawites, and will take their revenge only at the moment of victory. On the other hand, the majority of the insurgents are in favor of a free, democratic republic. We must learn to forgive, and forgiving sometimes means forgetting, or life becomes impossible. With its many religious and ethnic minorities, Syria is not cut out to be a theocratic state. The Muslim Brotherhood party is active, but in an election it wouldn’t win as much as 10% of the votes. It will get those votes, too, but first it has to accept the laws of a democratic state, officially declare that it is opposed to the idea of a caliphate and accepts Christians, and explain its finances and its relationship with Saudi Arabia. Without Saudi Arabia, the Muslim Brotherhood is harmless.

N.M.: Is the West right to feel anxious about the Christians of Syria?

R.S.: That is pure hypocrisy. In fifty years, the West hasn’t concerned itself for a second with the welfare of Arab Christians living under dictatorships. In fact, the opposite. Of course the Christians of Syria, like all minorities, have always been endangered, but they have lived under the protection of the Muslim population for thousands of years—even during the Crusades—and they will also survive the transition to democracy.

Translation of “Ein Gespräch mit Rafik Schami.” © 2011 by Rafik Schami. By arrangement with the author. Translation © 2011 by Anthea Bell. All rights reserved.

English German (Original)

Rafik Schami was born in Damascus in 1946, came to Germany in 1971, and studied chemistry in Heidelberg. Today he is the most successful German-speaking Arabic writer. His novels have been translated into twenty-three languages and received numerous international awards. His bestselling books include The Dark Side of Love, The Calligrapher’s Secret, and Damascus Nights.

Syrian journalist Nadia Midani spoke with Rafik Schami earlier this year. The following is an edited transcript of that conversation.

Nadia Midani: I’ll begin by asking what will be left in the end.  I know it’s a trap, and no one can give a real answer to that question, but I will ask it all the same: what alternatives face the Syrians now?

Rafik Schami: Only God can tell, along with a few of those who always think they know everything. But first, whoever wins, Syria will never return to conditions as they were before March 2011. Second, the present dramatic developments will leave many wounds behind, and they will take a long time to heal. Here lies the embryonic danger of civil war, which is cultivated by the regime so that it can claim to be fighting Sunni extremists. That virulent embryo will still be a danger even if the insurgency overthrows the president. Third, the regime has stripped off, forever,  Bashar al Assad’s mask as “the ophthalmologist who studied in London and is married to a charming, fashion-conscious woman.” Bashar al Assad is increasingly assuming the appearance of a dictator who— like his father in 1982—will bomb his country’s own cities, send marksmen to shoot down demonstrators, arrest and torture tens of thousands. Fourth …

N.M.: Could it be that he has lost control, and his brother Maher is now in charge of everything?

R.S.: The army and all fifteen secret services answer directly to the president. We can come back to that later, but for now a brief  response to the original question: fourth, the Syrians have paid a high price for casting off their fears. So far they have over  two thousand dead to mourn, and their insurgency may cost them yet more, but as they have done it all independently, indeed in isolation, and without any outside help, no dictatorship can terrify them now. The streets are becoming politicized as never before in the last hundred years. Every government will feel the force of that.

N.M.:  When and where exactly did the Syrian uprising begin?

R.S.: On March 15, 2011. It was children in the previously sleepy, dusty town of Daraa who unintentionally instigated revolt. Innocently and guilelessly, they wrote on the walls, in chalk and spray paint, things that adults were discussing only under their breath. Thereupon the head of the secret service in Daraa, a cousin of the president, had the children captured and tortured. That was more than the parents could tolerate.

N.M.: Unlike you, I still hoped that Assad junior would gradually implement reforms, and lead Syria into a democracy where many voices could be heard … I’ll admit now, in sackcloth and ashes, that at the time I publicly criticized your firm rejection of that idea when you wrote, “What Syria needs is democracy, not heirs to Assad.” All the same, I’ll ask you now, could there have been options other than rebellion?

R.S.: My obdurate attitude to that idea was, and still is, bound up with my exile. Exile has some advantages, as well as its obvious drawbacks. In exile, you can inform yourself better, and develop and express your thoughts freely. Syria was the first Arab republic to pass on power by inheritance. As if there were no other capable women or men in all Syria who could have governed the country—and done it in accord with the will of the people.  Appointing the colorless Bashar al-Assad, who took no interest in politics, as his father’s successor was alien to any concept of democracy. The secret services had grave doubts. The man was given a crash course in suitable behavior, and promoted to military ranks that would normally require  twenty years of army experience. He was then presented to the people as a reformer, and he did in fact set up two study groups, which met, of course, under the close supervision of the secret service. He allowed the publication of a satirical magazine, and had a few corrupt ministers arrested. From the first, it was nothing but a theatrical show of which he was director, until all the army generals and all of the leadership cadre either proclaimed their loyalty or were dismissed. After that he governed for eleven years without a single reform. It was easier to get a clear idea of all that from abroad than from within the country. Here in exile, we turned a skeptical eye to the euphoria. We saw the old Mafia replaced, but by their sons; that was the sole change. And the regime of those sons grew even bolder. Who gave away all telecommunications rights to his cousin? How can a penniless cousin of the president get to be a billionaire in ten years? Where do the billions of the Assad family in European and American banks come from? And then that same Assad presents himself to his people as anti-American.

N.M.: All the same, why can’t such a regime be reformed?

N.S.: Because at the very first step toward serious reform it would implode, collapsing from the center outward. That first step would have to be the dissolution of all  fifteen secret services. The second would be to give the Syrian people back the billions of which they have been robbed. We don’t need developmental aid. Anything else is only a superficial spectacle staged for the benefit of an equally superficial press. An opportunity for reform did in fact exist for a few days. As soon as the uprising began,  the president, with the support of the majority of the population, which never demanded his removal but was demonstrating for freedom and democracy and against corruption, could have gathered some of his best advisers around him and dissolved the secret services. He would have had to introduce radical reforms in comprehensible steps that were open to daily scrutiny. He would have been the hero of the people, and the people would have protected him and his life. Alternatively, he might have been dead even before he had announced the last clause of his proposed reforms, murdered by his own henchmen. But as they would not have had time to build anyone up as his successor, the change to democracy would have come more quickly.

N.M.: Is Bashar al-Assad really leader of the regime, or just a puppet of the secret services?

R.S.: He’s its leader. He shares power with his family, but he bears full responsibility, because the army and the secret service answer directly to him. On the other hand he himself, like his leadership, is caught in a system that oppresses and dictates to  twenty million people. 

N.M.: Does the fact that children began the revolution explain the hatred of the secret services for them? The murder of Hamza al Khatib, for instance?

R.S.: Not entirely, because they could have killed him and made sure that he was never seen again, like thousands of others who have disappeared without trace. But they brought the boy’s mutilated body back to his parents. He must have suffered hell on earth in the last hour of his life. It was a message, a warning: we will spare no one, and we will hit you where it hurts most.

N.M.: But it had the opposite effect.

R.S.: Because the secret service didn’t stop to think that even the most peace-loving of Syrians are implacable if you touch their children. Hamza al Khatib became the icon of the Syrian revolution, and since his death the insurgents have been demonstrating not just on Fridays, as they did before, but every day.

N.M.: But not in Aleppo and Damascus, except on the outskirts of those large cities. A friend of mine phones me regularly from a bar in the center of Damascus, laughing and chatting as if he were in Paris.

R.S.: The tradition of cities in Asian countries, including Syria, is not the same as in Europe. In an Arab city, for instance, the ruler was ever-present with his adherents, military leaders, and the organizations of the secret service, the army, and the police. Feudal lords lived in cities, not on their landed estates as they did in Europe, where the city was able to develop as a civil power, a counterweight to theirs, and a center of resistance. In Damascus and Aleppo traders and industrialists, importers, and other beneficiaries of the system have made more profit than ever before in history. The people of those cities therefore have something to lose. Insurgency in Damascus and Aleppo would mean the end of the regime.

N.M.: And why didn’t the provinces rebel against the father, only now against the son?

R.S.: Because the time wasn’t ripe for it then, because insurgency had to be triggered by events in the neighboring Arab countries, and because Assad senior and his aides came from the provinces themselves, and cultivated their relationship with their origins. Many thousands from the tribes of the men in power were appointed to posts in the army, the secret service, and the police. The second generation, that’s to say the sons of those men, became townsfolk and were happy to forget their peasant origin. The people of the provinces were plunged into misery and want, and now they are answering back.

N.M.: The regime says it is fighting armed terrorists. By now that claim looks more than ridiculous, since over fifteen thousand Syrians have fled from the army allegedly protecting them and taken refuge in Turkey. I admire the courage of the civilians who hope for peaceful regime change, but in view of the brutality of the troops of the president’s brother Maher al Assad, their attitude looks to me suicidal.

R.S.: The Syrian nation is showing what a civilization ten thousand years old means. I bow to that civilized stance. But about your fears. This  nonviolent insurgency in Syria is the longest in its history. No ruler in the world has an answer to that kind of thing. The regime is merely reacting, the initiative passed into the hands of the insurgents long ago, and they have already done a  great deal. The length of their nonviolent  resistance will overthrow the regime, whose movements are being paralyzed. The businessmen who still stand by the government will withdraw their support when their businesses fail. That’s the open secret of this revolution. Anyone calling on the Syrian people to take up arms is either an idiot or an agent of the regime, because if they did that, then the slavishly obedient, well-armed and well-drilled troops of the president’s brother, brother-in-law, and cousin would prevail.

N.M.: How great is the influence of writers and creative cultural figures in bringing democracy to Syria? Must intellectuals state the line they take on politics and insurgency?

R.S.: Literature and art can exert only indirect political influence. Whenever prominent figures in those fields have tried the direct way, the consequences have been catastrophic. The role of artists, writers, and intellectuals, in my opinion, is to intensify discussion during the period of insurgency, to encourage people to choose the humane path, and to offer the hand of friendship to their former enemies. Of course, independent courts will have to see that all crimes committed by the overthrown rulers get their just punishment. But not as an act of revenge—in the spirit of a democratic process aiming for maturity. Flight from responsibility with the aid of hypocritical arguments would be a mistake.

N.M.: Are any Syrian artists politically active in the country itself? What about those who work with the government?

R.S.: Of course some are politically active at home. In Syria, as well as in exile, there are courageous artists, writers, and intellectuals who oppose the dictatorship. There are also others who are hand in glove with the government and are happy to receive its patronage and prizes. The joke is that you can also find their names on the lists of signatures of those who want to see the regime overthrown. Now, however, the insurgents are publishing the names of these corrupt artists who will grovel to power. Dictators are like nuclear power stations: they promise much, and contaminate those who come into contact with them. Arabs are not alone in paying homage to the dictators. The prospect of gain has also seduced Germans and other Europeans into working for Saud, Assad, Gadhafi, and Saddam Hussein.

N.M.: What exactly is so seductive about power that it can attract intellectuals?

R.S.: It’s not so much the direct advantages—money, a car, a house—as the vanity that is gratified by proximity to power. Writers, artists, and intellectuals are far from immune to it. You accompany a president on a state visit, you’re received by the ministers—foreign affairs, home affairs, culture—of another country, you dine with prominent men who mention in passing that they were on the phone only yesterday to Obama, Sarkozy, the Devil in person for all I know. All that is tempting. Many such artists, particularly the older ones who feel that they are languishing in the shadows, will try to get a share of the limelight again—and make themselves look ridiculous.

N.M.: As far as I can tell, the Syrian uprising has no head, which gives me cause for concern. It is not led by any political party or cadre.  Isn’t that dangerous?

R.S.: What has happened in the Arab countries is unprecedented, and it is still going on. There has never been anything comparable in history before: a revolution without a charismatic leadership, without weapons, or a political party, victoriously bringing down dictators. It succeeded extremely well in Tunisia and Egypt. Syria is a more complicated proposition, because it is a very important piece in the whole Arab game of dominoes, and because its present regime has more experience than any other of civil war (in Lebanon) and of the uninterrupted rule of one family over a period of forty years. But it’s just because the uprising here is not led by any distinct group that the dictatorship is finding it so hard to suppress. Earlier, the regime could paralyze any opposition within a week by arresting its leadership. Today it arrests  ten thousand Syrian citizens, kills two thousand, destroys towns and cities—and the insurgency just gets stronger. That strength is also the weakness of the revolution, because unlike a centrally led movement, it has no distinct aim. Modern means of communication—Facebook, Twitter, the Internet, cameras, cellphones—provide it with something like a nervous system to protect it from deadly attack. But eventually there must be local coordinating committees, agreeing on strategy and tactics with other committees, or the insurgents will be going around in circles.

N.M.: Let’s assume that Assad falls. What comes next? What dangers lie in wait? Suppose fundamentalists try turning Syria into a theocratic state?

R.S.: Slowly, take it slowly! Assad hasn’t fallen yet, and I am afraid he’s not about to stand down without starting a civil war. Here he could model himself on Gadhafi. That would be a catastrophe, and all my articles in opposition newspapers warn Syrians against that danger. It exists because so much blood has been shed, and because fundamentalists agitate against the Alawites, and will take their revenge only at the moment of victory. On the other hand, the majority of the insurgents are in favor of a free, democratic republic. We must learn to forgive, and forgiving sometimes means forgetting, or life becomes impossible. With its many religious and ethnic minorities, Syria is not cut out to be a theocratic state. The Muslim Brotherhood party is active, but in an election it wouldn’t win as much as 10% of the votes. It will get those votes, too, but first it has to accept the laws of a democratic state, officially declare that it is opposed to the idea of a caliphate and accepts Christians, and explain its finances and its relationship with Saudi Arabia. Without Saudi Arabia, the Muslim Brotherhood is harmless.

N.M.: Is the West right to feel anxious about the Christians of Syria?

R.S.: That is pure hypocrisy. In fifty years, the West hasn’t concerned itself for a second with the welfare of Arab Christians living under dictatorships. In fact, the opposite. Of course the Christians of Syria, like all minorities, have always been endangered, but they have lived under the protection of the Muslim population for thousands of years—even during the Crusades—and they will also survive the transition to democracy.

Ein Gespräch mit Rafik Schami

Nadia Midani  ist Journalistin, 1955 in Damaskus geboren, studierte in Paris Soziologie und promovierte über „Sippen- und Dorfstrukturen der arabischen Metropolen“. Sie arbeitet bis heute als Journalistin in Damaskus und Paris. Das Regime duldete sie, wegen ihrer mächtigen Sippe, wie sie ironisch sag. wurde sie nie verhaftet. Onkel Schwager und Cousins aus der Midani-Sippe waren in den letzten 40 Jahren führende Generäle und Minister. Aber Nadia Midani, das schwarze Schaf der Familie, durfte nie in der staatlichen Zeitung veröffentlichen. Sie gehörte jahrelang  zur Redaktion der arabischen Ausgabe der französischen Monatzeitschrift „Le Monde diplomatique“ in Beirut.

*          *          *

 

Nadia Midani: Ich werde mit dem anfangen, was am Ende bleibt. Ich weiß, es ist eine Falle, niemand wird eine richtige Antwort geben können. Trotzdem stelle ich die Frage: Welche Alternativen stellen sich jetzt den Syrern?

Rafik Schami: Das wissen nur Gott und ein paar ewige Besserwisser. Es gibt aber trotzdem Eckpunkte, innerhalb derer sich eine Antwort finden könnte. Erstens, Syrien wird, wer auch immer siegt, nie wieder zu den Zuständen vor dem März 2011 zurückkehren. Zweitens, diese dramatische Entwicklung wird viele Wunden zurücklassen, deren Heilung sehr lange Zeit in Anspruch nehmen wird. Hier liegt ein gefährlicher Keim für einen Bürgerkrieg, den das Regime züchtet, um dann zu sagen, das sei ein Kampf gegen die sunnitischen Extremisten. Dieser Keim bleibt virulent, auch wenn der Aufstand den Herrscher stürzt. Drittens, das Regime hat die Maske „des Augenarztes, der in London studiert hat und mit einer charmanten, modisch bewussten Frau verheiratet ist“ für immer herunter gerissen. Baschar al Assad bekam immer mehr das Gesicht eines Diktators, der – wie sein Vater 1982 – seine eigenen Städte bombardiert, der mit Scharfschützen auf  Demonstranten schießen lässt, der Zehntausende verhaftet und foltern lässt. Viertens…

 

N. M.: Kann es sein, dass er die Kontrolle verloren hat, dass sein Bruder Maher das Ganze anführt?  

R. S.: Armee und alle 15 Geheimdienste sind dem Präsidenten direkt unterstellt. Wir können noch darauf zurückkommen, aber noch kurz zur Antwort auf die erste Frage: Viertens, die Syrer haben viel für das Abstreifen der Angst bezahlt. Sie haben bis heute über 2000 Tote zu beklagen. Es kann sie noch mehr kosten, aber da sie alles selbstständig, ja isoliert und ohne jede Hilfe, geleistet haben, kann ihnen keine Diktatur mehr Angst machen. Die Straße politisiert sich, wie noch nie in den letzten  hundert Jahren. Jede Regierung wird das zu spüren bekommen.

 

N. M.: Wo und wann genau hat denn der syrische Aufstand angefangen?

R. S.. Es war am 15.3.2011, und es waren Kinder, die ungewollt in der bis dahin schläfrigen, staubigen Stadt Daraa den Aufstand anzettelten. Sie schrieben unschuldig und arglos mit Kreide und Spray das auf die Mauern, worüber die Erwachsenen nur leise sprachen. Der Chef des Geheimdienstes in Daraa, ein Cousin des Präsidenten, ließ die Kinder daraufhin gefangen nehmen und foltern. Das war für die Eltern unerträglich.

 

N. M.: Ich hoffte aber, im Gegensatz zu Ihnen, immer noch, dass der Sohn nun nach und nach Reformen durchsetzt und Syrien in eine vielstimmige Demokratie führt… Nun, ich gebe zu, mit Asche auf dem Haupt, ich habe damals Ihre sture Ablehnung öffentlich kritisiert, als Sie geschrieben haben „Syrien braucht Demokratie und keine Assad-Erben“. Trotzdem frage ich jetzt, hätte es an Stelle der Rebellion andere Möglichkeiten gegeben?

R. S.: Meine unversöhnliche Haltung hatte und hat mit meinem Exil zu tun, das neben seinen bekannten Nachteilen auch Vorteile hat. Man kann sich besser informieren und seine Gedanken frei entwickeln und äußern. Syrien war die erste arabische Republik, in der Herrschaft vererbt wird. Als gäbe in ganz Syrien keine fähigen Frauen oder Männer, die dieses Land regieren könnten – und zwar nach dem Willen des Volkes. Diesen blassen Mann Baschar al Assad, der mit Politik nichts zu tun haben wollte, als Nachfolger zu benennen, war eine Beleidigung des republikanischen Gedankens. Die Geheimdienste hatten große Bedenken. Man hat dem Mann im Schnellkurs Umgangsformen beigebracht und erhob ihn in Militärränge, die normalerweise 20 Jahre Erfahrung in einer Armee verlangen. Man hat ihn dann als „Reformer“ verkauft, und er ließ öffentlich ein paar Arbeitskreise tagen, natürlich unter genauer Beobachtung des Geheimdienstes. Er erlaubte eine satirische Zeitschrift und ließ ein paar korrupte Minister verhaften. Es war ein Schauspiel, dessen Regie er führte, von Anfang an, bis alle Armeegeneräle, alle politischen Führungskader entweder ihre Loyalität bekundeten, oder entlassen wurden. Und dann regierte er elf Jahre ohne eine einzige Reform. Das alles war vom Ausland aus besser zu überblicken als im Inland. Wir, hier im Exil, beobachteten die Euphorie skeptisch und sahen, wie die alte Mafia nur durch ihre Söhne ersetzt wurde. Das war die einzige Änderung. Und das Regime dieser Söhne wurde noch frecher. Wer hat alle Telekommunikationsrechte an seinen Cousin verschenkt? Wie kann ein Cousin des Präsidenten von einem Habenichts in zehn Jahren zu einem Milliardär werden? Woher stammen die Milliarden der Familie Assad auf den europäischen und amerikanischen Banken?

Und dann verkauft der gleiche Assad sich vor seinem Volk als Gegner der Amerikaner.

 

N. M.: Aber trotzdem, warum kann so ein Regime nicht reformiert werden?

R.S.  Weil es bereits beim ersten Schritt einer ernsthaften Reform von innen heraus zusammen bricht, implodiert. Dieser erste Schritt wäre die Auflösung aller 15 Geheimdienste. Der zweite Schritt dann, dem syrischen Volk die geraubten Milliarden zurückzugeben. Wir brauchen keine Entwicklungshilfe.

Alles andere ist nur oberflächliches Theater für eine ebenso oberflächliche Presse. Trotzdem, eine Möglichkeit gab es für ein paar Tage. Unmittelbar nach Ausbruch des Aufstands am 15.3.2011 hätte der Präsident, gestützt auf die Massen, die niemals und nirgends zu seinem Sturz aufriefen, sondern für Freiheit, Demokratie und gegen die Korruption demonstrierten, einige seiner besten Berater um sich scharen und sofort die Geheimdienste auflösen können. Er hätte radikale Reformen einführen müssen, in täglich kontrollierbaren und nachvollziehbaren Schritten. Er wäre zum Helden des Volkes geworden und das hätte ihn und sein Leben geschützt. Aber vielleicht wäre er tot gewesen, noch bevor er den letzten Satz seiner geplanten Reform ausgesprochen hat. Von seinen eigenen Schergen ermordet.

Dann wäre allerdings der Wechsel zur Demokratie schneller passiert, weil die keine Zeit gehabt hätten, einen Nachfolger aufzubauen.

Was aber hat er gemacht? Er ist erst einmal 14 Tage verschwunden und gab seinem mörderischen Bruder Maher al Assad, und seinem Schwager Assef Schaukat den Befehl, alles zu ersticken. Bis heute hat er, autistisch wie alle arabischen Diktatoren, nichts gelernt. Er taucht auf, verspricht Reformen, verspricht, dass ab sofort nicht mehr auf die Demonstranten geschossen werde und am darauffolgenden Tag werden doppelt so viele ermordet.

 

N. M.: Ist Baschar al Assad der Anführer des Regimes oder doch nur eine Marionette der Geheimdienste?

R. S.: Er ist der Anführer. Er teilt die Macht mit seiner Familie, aber er trägt die volle Verantwortung, da Armee und Geheimdienst ihm direkt unterstellt sind. Andererseits ist er selbst, wie auch seine Führung, gefangen in diesem System, das 20 Millionen Menschen bevormundet und unterdrückt.

 

 

N. M.: Erklärt der Beginn der Revolution durch Kinder den Hass der Geheimdienstler auf die Kinder? Etwa bei der Ermordung von Hamza al Khatib?

R. S.: Nur unzureichend, weil sie ihn hätten töten und verschwinden lassen können, wie Tausende, die spurlos verschwanden. Aber sie brachten den Eltern seine verstümmelte Leiche zurück. Der Junge muss in der letzten Stunde seines Lebens die Hölle auf Erden erlebt haben. Es war eine Botschaft, eine Warnung: Wir werden niemanden schonen und wir treffen euch an eurer empfindlichsten Stelle.

 

N. M.: Das hatte aber die gegenteilige Wirkung.

R. S.: Weil der Geheimdienst nicht bedacht hat, dass die friedlichsten Syrer unversöhnlich werden, wenn man ihre Kinder anfasst. Hamza al Khatib wurde zur Ikone der syrischen Revolution und die Aufständischen demonstrieren seit seinem Tod nicht nur freitags wie zuvor, sondern jeden Tag.

 

N. M.: Aber nicht in Aleppo und Damaskus. Wenn man von den Rändern dieser Großstädte absieht. Ein Freund von mir telefoniert regelmäßig mit mir aus einem Lokal im Zentrum der Stadt Damaskus und lacht und plaudert, als wäre er in Paris.

R. S.: Die Städte in den asiatischen Ländern, darunter Syrien, haben eine andere Tradition als die Städte in Europa. In der arabischen Stadt z.B. war der Herrscher mit seiner Anhängerschaft, seinen Militärführern, seinem Geheimdienst-, Militär- und Polizeiapparat präsent. Die Feudalherren lebten in der Stadt und saßen nicht in ihren Besitztümern wie in Europa, wo sich die Stadt zu einem bürgerlichen Gegengewicht und einem Zentrum des Widerstands entwickeln konnte.

In Damaskus und Aleppo haben Händler und  Industrielle, Importeure und andere Nutznießer so viele Gewinne erzielt wie noch nie in der Geschichte. Das heißt, dort haben die Menschen etwas zu verlieren.

Der Aufstand von Damaskus und Aleppo würde das Ende des Regimes bedeuten.

 

N. M.: Und warum rebellierte die Provinz nicht gegen den Vater, sondern erst jetzt gegen den Sohn?

R. S.: Weil die Zeit nicht reif war damals, weil es den Auslöser in den umliegenden arabischen Ländern brauchte, und weil der Vater Assad und seine Helfer selbst aus der Provinz kamen und die Beziehung zu ihrem Ursprung pflegten. Viele Tausende wurden aus den Sippen der an der Herrschaft Beteiligten zu Posten in Armee, Geheimdienst und Polizei berufen. Die zweite Generation, also die Söhne dieser Schicht wurden Städter und vergaßen gerne ihren bäuerlichen Ursprung. Die Menschen der Provinz stürzten ins Elend und jetzt geben sie die Antwort darauf.

 

N. M.: Das Regime behauptet, es seien bewaffnete Terroristen, die es bekämpft. Das ist inzwischen mehr als lächerlich, seit mehr als fünfzehntausend Syrer vor ihrer schützenden Armee in die Türkei geflüchtet sind. Ich persönlich bewundere den Mut der Zivilisten, friedlich das Regime stürzen zu wollen, aber ich sehe das als Selbstmord angesichts der Brutalität der Truppen des Bruders Maher al Assad.

R. S.: Das syrische Volk zeigt, was eine zehntausend Jahre alte Zivilisation bedeutet. Ich verneige mich vor dieser Zivilisiertheit. Aber nun zu Ihrer Befürchtung. Der friedliche syrische Aufstand ist der längste der Geschichte. Darauf hat kein Herrscher der Welt eine Antwort. Das Regime reagiert nur noch, die Initiative ist längst in der Hand der Aufständischen und damit ist schon ungeheuer viel erreicht. Die Dauer des friedlichen Aufstands wird das Regime niederwerfen. Sie lähmt seine Bewegung. Die Händler, die jetzt noch zu ihm stehen, werden es bei Niedergang ihrer Geschäfte fallen lassen. Das ist das offene Geheimnis dieser Revolution. Wer aufruft, zu den Waffen zu greifen, ist entweder ein Idiot oder Agent des Regimes, denn in diesem Falle würde die sklavisch gehorsame, hochbewaffnete und bestens gedrillte Truppe des Bruders und Schwagers und Cousins des Präsidenten siegen.

 

N. M.: Wie groß ist der Einfluss von Schriftstellern und Kulturschaffenden auf die Demokratisierung Syriens? Müssen sich Intellektuelle zu Politik und Revolutionen äußern?

R. S.: Literatur und Kunst können nur einen indirekten politischen Einfluss nehmen. Und immer wenn sie versuchten, direkt zu werden, hatte das katastrophale Folgen. Die Rolle der Künstler, Schriftsteller oder Intellektuellen ist m.E., die Diskussion während der Revolution zu vertiefen, die Menschen zu ermutigen, einen humanen Weg einzuschlagen und die Hand auch den einstigen Feinden zu reichen. Sicher, unabhängige Gerichte müssen für eine gerechte Bestrafung jener Verbrechen sorgen, die die gestürzten Herrscher begingen. Aber nicht als Racheakt, sondern im Sinne eines demokratischen Reifungsprozesses. Die Flucht vor der Verantwortung mit scheinheiligen Argumenten wäre ein Fehler.

 

N. M.: Gibt es syrische Künstler, die sich im Inland politisch engagieren? Was wird aus denen, die mit der Macht arbeiteten?

R. S.: Sicher gibt es sie. Sowohl im Exil, als auch in Syrien gibt es mutige Künstler, Schriftsteller und Intellektuelle, die gegen die Diktatur sind. Es gibt aber auch jene, die grundsätzlich mit den Diktatoren liebäugeln und deren Förderungen und Preise kassieren. Der Witz der Geschichte ist, dass man dieselben Namen später auf den Unterschriftenlisten der Umstürzler wieder finden kann.

Aber jetzt veröffentlichen die Revolutionäre die Namen dieser korrupten Kriecher. Diktatoren ähneln Kernkraftwerken: Sie versprechen viel und verseuchen jeden, der mit ihnen in Berührung kommt. Es sind nicht nur Araber, die den Diktatoren huldigen. Auch Deutsche und Europäer verführt immer wieder das Geld, und so wurden sie zu Handlangern von Saud, Assad, Gadhafi und Saddam Hussein.

 

N. M.: Was ist an der Macht so verführerisch, dass sie Intellektuelle anzieht?

R. S.: Es ist weniger der direkte Vorteil, Geld, Auto oder Haus als vielmehr die Eitelkeit, die durch die Nähe zur Macht befriedigt wird. Schriftsteller, Künstler und Intellektuelle sind am wenigsten immun gegen diese Krankheit. Man begleitet einen Präsidenten bei einem Staatsbesuch…, man wird vom Kultur- Innen- oder Außenminister eines anderen Landes empfangen, man tafelt mit den wichtigsten Männern, die nebenbei erwähnen, dass sie gestern mit Obama, Sarkozy oder dem Teufel telefoniert haben. Das alles verführt. Viele, vor allem alternde Kollegen, die langsam in den Schatten geraten, versuchen wieder etwas mehr ins Rampenlicht zu kommen – und wirken dabei elend lächerlich.

 

N. M.: Die syrische Revolution scheint mir ohne Kopf zu sein, das scheint mir bedenklich. Keine Partei oder kein Kader führt sie. Ist das nicht gefährlich?

R. S.: Das, was in den arabischen Ländern geschehen ist, und noch geschieht, ist neu. Etwas Vergleichbares gab es noch nicht in der Geschichte, eine Revolution, die ohne charismatische Führung, ohne Partei, ohne Waffen siegreich ihren Diktator stürzt. Die Tunesier und Ägypter haben das großartig gemacht. In Syrien ist es komplizierter, weil Syrien ein sehr wichtiger Dominostein in der arabischen Konstellation ist, und weil dieses Regime das erfahrenste mit Bürgerkrieg (im Libanon) und mit der stetigen Herrschaft einer Familie seit 40 Jahren ist. Aber gerade, weil die Revolution keinen eindeutig bestimmten Kader hat, ist es für die Diktatur so schwer, sie zu unterdrücken. Früher lähmten sie die Opposition innerhalb einer Woche, indem sie die Führung festnahm. Heute verhaften sie 10.000, töten 2000, zerstören Städte – und der Aufstand wird immer stärker. Diese Stärke ist auch zugleich die Schwäche der Revolution, weil sie nicht zielgerichtet ist, wie eine zentralgeführte Bewegung. Die modernen Kommunikationsmittel Facebook, Twitter, Internet, Kameras, Handys geben ihr so etwas wie ein Nervensystem, schützen sie vor tödlichen Übergriffen.

Aber langsam müssen lokale Koordinationskomitees entstehen, die mit anderen Komitees ihre Strategie und Taktik abstimmen, sonst bewegen sich die Aufständischen im Kreis

 

N. M.: Nehmen wir an, Assad wird stürzen. Was kommt danach? Welche Gefahren lauern dann? Was, wenn die Fundamentalisten Syrien in einen Gottesstaat verwandeln wollen?

R. S.: langsam, langsam. Assad ist noch nicht gestürzt und ich fürchte, er wird nicht abdanken, ohne einen Bürgerkrieg anzuzetteln. Hier hätte er Gadhafi als Vorbild. Das wäre die größte Katastrophe, und davor warne ich in allen meinen Artikeln in den oppositionellen Zeitungen. Weil so viel Blut geflossen ist, und weil Fundamentalisten gegen die Alawiten hetzen, und nun im Augenblick des Sieges Rache nehmen werden, ist diese Gefahr da. Aber dagegen steht die Mehrheit der Aufständischen, die für eine demokratische, freiheitliche Republik sind. Wir müssen lernen zu verzeihen, und Verzeihen bedeutet etwas zu vergessen, sonst wird das Leben unmöglich. Syrien ist mit seinen vielfältigen, religiösen und ethnischen Minderheiten ungeeignet für einen Gottesstaat. Die Partei der Muslimbrüder ist aktiv, aber sie würde bei einer Wahl nicht einmal 10% der Stimmen bekommen, und die soll sie bekommen, aber sie muss erst die Gesetze des demokratischen Staates akzeptieren und offiziell erklären, dass sie gegen das Kalifat ist, die Christen akzeptiert und ihre Finanzen und ihre Beziehung zu Saudi-Arabien klar legen. Ohne Saudi-Arabien ist diese Partei harmlos.

 

N. M.: Ist die Sorge des Westens um die Christen berechtigt?

R. S.: Das ist reine Heuchelei. Der Westen hat sich keine Sekunde in fünfzig Jahren um das Wohl der arabischen Christen unter der Diktatur gekümmert. Ganz im Gegenteil. Die Christen in Syrien waren natürlich immer wie alle Minderheiten gefährdet, aber sie genossen seit Tausenden von Jahren das geschützte Leben mit den Muslimen…Auch während der Kreuzzüge…und sie werden auch den Übergang zur Demokratie überleben.

© 2011 by Rafik Schami

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